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It’s Good to be Square: The Kandinsky-fication of Law (Working Paper) 1 
 
Paresh Kathrani 2 
 
 
"If he thought, or may have thought, that in throwing the child he was exposing him 
to only the slight risk of being injured, then you would probably readily conclude that 
he did not intend to cause serious injury, because it was outside his contemplation 
that he would be seriously injured. But the defence say here that he never thought 
about the consequence at all when he threw the child. He did not give it a moment's 
thought. Again, if that is right, or may be right, you may readily conclude that he did 
not appreciate that serious harm would result. It follows from that, if that is how you 
find, that you cannot infer that he intended to do Karl really serious harm unless you 
are sure that serious harm was a virtual certainty from what he was doing and he 
appreciated that that was the case.” (R v Woollin) 3 
 
 
1. Introduction: A Focus on Words  
 
This working paper is about legal pedagogy. It considers one approach that is often 
taken to the study of law. This method focuses on legal terms in abstract. Important 
concepts such as ‘foresight’, ‘reasonableness’ and ‘proximity’ are often defined and 
focussed on in and of themselves, without reference to their various vibrations or 
stratums. As such, when these terms are applied to facts or considered in essays, 
the analysis is often not as detailed or deep as it could be if there were an absorption 
in the wider sounds of the concepts. Silence sometimes abounds, when there ought 
to be noise.  
 
The case of R v Woollin provides a useful illustration. In this case, the House of 
Lords had to consider if the defendant, who had thrown his three-year-old son 
against a solid surface, had intended to kill or cause him serious injury. The Law 
Lords identified that intention in criminal law was not just limited to the defendant’s 
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primary aim, but could also exist when a particular outcome was a virtually certain 
consequence of the defendant pursuing his primary aim and the defendant 
appreciated that. This test, otherwise known as ‘oblique intention’, constitutes one of 
the two legal tests for the mens rea of intention in English criminal law, the other one 
being ‘direct intent’. As the definition of oblique intention in Woollin, the leading case, 
states, it is based, inter alia, on an appreciation of the risk. This imports the 
requirement that the defendant must have had some foresight of risk, which in turn 
can be related to the importance that criminal law attaches to the notions of agency 
and blame.4 The issue of whether a given defendant had an appreciation or foresight 
of risk requires one to put himself or herself in the position of the defendant. It 
necessitates a consideration of a multitude of different factors, including the 
characteristics of the defendant, his mood around the time of the offence, the 
circumstances in which he found himself and also his reactions to them. As such, the 
application of the concept of ‘appreciation or foresight of risk’ is a composite one that 
takes in a complexity of many factors. However, going back to what was mentioned 
above, the concept of ‘an appreciation or foresight’ of risk has often been 
approached by some students in and of itself. The focus has every so often been on 
what do the words ‘appreciation’, ‘foresight’ and ‘risk’ mean per se, devoid of context. 
This has on many occasions led to a narrow application of the law.  
 
 
2. Ontology and an Argument for Emotive Feelings   
 
Looking at new ways to study law is important, especially in terms of formative 
assessment. 5 This paper posits that, ontologically, there should be no difference 
between how law students discuss situations outside of the law school environment 
and within. There is sometimes a tendency to perceive the law school as a closed 
system that is removed from other systems in their lifeworld. However, one of the 
bases of this paper is that these systems are, essentially, one ontological continuum. 
For example, arguably, at home, law students have been involved in disagreements. 
This will have involved the defence of some position. These positions will naturally 
                                            
4 See Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 on subjectivity  
 
5 Feliú, Vicenç, and Helen Frazer. "Outcomes assessment and legal research pedagogy." Legal Reference 
Services Quarterly 31.2 (2012) p. 188  
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rest on concepts, such as ‘right’, ‘fair’ and ‘wrong’. In the course of these arguments, 
the conscious focus will not be on the meaning of these concepts, but on creating a 
persuasive web out of the many different milieus that substantiate those concepts in 
their favour. One of the arguments of this paper is that law students should take the 
same, contextual and persuasive approach to their law studies, as opposed to the 
heavy emphasis on words in themselves.  
 
This leads onto another argument of this paper. As mentioned, the primary assertion 
that is being made is that, ontologically, there should be no difference between how 
law students look at contentions issues outside of law school and within. Both call for 
a wider, contextual consideration of concepts. However, complex existential 
boundaries often arise (but certainly not in all cases). Students sometimes see 
themselves as different beings in law schools and on the outside. This raises the 
question as to why. One reason that will be postulated by the final paper is linked to 
emotions. It is posited that when a student, or indeed, anyone, is asked to defend a 
position outside of the law school environment then it is emotive feelings that propels 
them to fervently consider and bring in the many wider contexts – the moral, the 
social, the economic, the political etc – that supports their application of the 
concepts. It is their own personal investment in the position being defended that 
draws them away from the essential vicinity of the concepts to look further afield in 
support of their argument. That is not to say that some students do not get 
passionate about the law! But naturally law students differ. As Deborah Zalesne and 
David Nadvorney, for example, identify in their work on ‘academic intelligence’ and 
‘othering’, students have different intelligences and will approach the study of law in 
many complex ways. 6 For this reason, some students may strongly focus on a need 
to understand the law - as opposed to the many impulses that underlie the 
application of the law - and this may leads to a heavy reliance on just the words. This 
can also arise because of a misunderstanding with the taxonomy of legal education.7 
Taxonomies generally arise when competencies are linked and classified according 
to objectives. It is, of course, important to identify learning outcomes on the basis of 
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Prepared Student as Other." J. Legal Educ. 61 (2011): p.265 
 
7 For an interesting discussion on the growing taxonomy of legal education, see Feliú Op cit. p. 189 
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which curricula can be designed. But some students may focus heavily on the words 
that constitute the learning outcomes, as opposed to their application.  
 
 
3. The Concreteness of Words in Contrast to Art 
 
For this reason, this paper essentially posits that stimulating a greater emotive 
attachment to the law may foster a stronger contextual grasp. There is, of course, 
nothing novel in that! Every law lecturer endeavours to deliver a motivating and 
thought-provoking class. However, the full paper will contend that art theory, and in 
particular some of the artist, Wassily Kandinsky’s, ideas, could constitute an effective 
pedagogic starting point in the study of law. 
 
In furtherance of this, the full paper will develop and expand upon the notion of the 
concreteness of words. On a very broad level, words, of course, have a number of 
meanings. For example, the one word ‘morality’ can be taken from a number of 
different viewpoints, including the consequential and deontological. Words change 
their meaning when they are added to other words, and even more so when different 
contexts are added. In short, words and the combination thereof are complex. This is 
something that will be explored in the larger work. There are obviously a multitude of 
other layers and nuances associated with words that will be looked at in the course 
of developing a larger paper, including ‘alterity’, and words’ social, cultural and 
literary aspects, amongst others.  
 
It is arguable that these semantic and literary gradations of words naturally provide 
some ground to encourage the emotive feelings that may facilitate the even deeper 
contextual analysis of legal concepts. That is, of course, true. However, in time, this 
paper will develop the claim that despite the many distinctions of words, they still 
remain bound by some meaning - and this may in some cases impede the emotive 




So why art? Art is the fulcrum around which the full paper will ultimately turn. For this 
reason, a strong and original pedagogic framework of art is being developed. 8 
However, in brief, the idea of art that is currently being looked at postulates that art is 
any sensational configuration whose sovereignty of meaning, by definition, resides 
elsewhere. 9 One may have a cup of coffee on their table. Its drinker will perceive its 
lines, its shapes, and its handles as a receptacle for carrying coffee. They will most 
probably not even give it a second thought. While they remain unconscious of its 
essence per se it sits there - quietly. They then notice it; that it is round and they ask 
themselves why and conclude that it’s most probably because it’s conducive to 
drinking. At this point, it is not art. It is instrumental because the drinker lays claim to 
meaning. It is only when and if the drinker concedes that sovereignty of its meaning 
must rest with the originator and with the originator alone is it on it’s road to 
becoming art. Thus, art is a meaningful yet elusive search for meaning. For the artist, 
art is ownership and individuality. 10 That is why this paper puts forward art as a 
pedagogic starting point. Art is different to words. Words sit within the structure of a 
lexicon. They often bind the writer or speaker. That is not to belittle words as a form 
of art. There have, of course, been countless awe-inspiring pieces of writing and 
plays, amongst other things, that have taken human feelings to many different, 
emotional levels. However, it is suggested that what made these ‘words’ art was that 
the reader or listener could not claim any ownership over their meaning as it lay 
elsewhere. Can this, and more relevantly, should this apply to the study of law?  
 
On one level, it can be argued that law should not be compared to art. This is 
because while the ambiguity of meaning is the very raison d’etre of art, the 
exactness of words is the bread and butter of law. The very industry of law is 
confirming words that can then be applied to resolve legal disputes. It would be 
                                            
8 As Richard Shusterman rightly identifies, it has been difficult to provide a definition of art: Shusterman, 
Richard “Pragmatic Ethics, Living, Beauty, Rethinking Art”, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, (2000), p.34  
 
9 This can be very broadly related to what Theodor Adorno says in ‘Aesthetic Theory’, ‘Artworks detach 
themselves from the empirical world and call forth another world’: Adorno, Theodor W. “Aesthetic Theory”, 
London, Athlone Press, (1997) p. 1 
 
10 Although a much wider aesthetic analysis will be undertaken for the final paper, for a good overall critique of 
art’s autonomy see: Scrutton, Roger, “Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind”, South Bend, St 




paradoxical if such words were open to different, subjective meanings as this would 
then prolong, as opposed to settle cases.  
 
However, legal concepts are never as stagnant as that. They are always contextual. 
For example, if one were to take the legal concept of ‘appreciation of risk’ per se 
from R v Woollin it would require one to be cognisant of a number of wider nuances. 
Indeed, learning outcomes in law often talk about the need to understand the law in 
its wider contexts and this is an essential skill in working with the law. 11 However, as 
discussed, some law students cling tenaciously to words. Rather than venture out 
and explore law’s many diverse, contextual contours they prefer to stick closely to its 
literal interpretations. It is for this reason that the full paper will contend, as argued 
above, that the very empowerment that art affords is an effective means to motivate 
students to explore the contours of law.  
 
The notion that students can explore the law with reference to art is not original. 
However, what the eventual paper will further argue is that Kandinsky’s ideas on ‘the 
spiritual in art’ 12 can form the basis of a pedagogic approach to law. As discussed 
above, there is an ontological divide between how some students apply concepts 
within the law school and outside that environment. This paper posits that in some 
cases, although not necessarily all, this can be explained with reference to emotional 
attachments. As students feel more emotively connected to the use of concepts 
outside the law school environment, they feel much more positive taking their 
meanings for granted and, indeed, using their different connotations and nuances. 
They also spend more time and often take more care exploring the different 
perspectives and contexts that engage those concepts. That’s not to say that 
emotions are necessarily the direct reasons. However, there is often resonance and 
confidence that comes with making something one’s own. For this reason, the end 
paper will argue that Kandinsky’s ‘spiritual in art’ can be used as a means to enable 
                                            
11 Lynch, Mary A. "Evaluation of Ten Concerns about Using Outcomes in Legal Education, An." Wm. Mitchell 
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students to invest themselves in the law through art. 13 It is this personal investment 
that will enable them take ownership and explore concepts. Rather than being bound 
by the concreteness of words, their conversion of the law into art and the ownership 
that this entails will stimulate them into looking at the complex nature of concepts 
beyond just a literal approach to words. The following Kandinsky-fication of law will 
explain why.  
 
 
4. Kandinsky’s Spirit 
 
A more forensic and systematic examination of Kandinsky’s work and ideas will form 
the basis of the larger paper. His art was mainly of an abstract nature. His later work 
did not always directly represent actual phenomena in the world. A symphony of 
points, lines, shapes and colours on a plane were used, which were often difficult 
decipher to begin with. What did Kandinsky mean by these images?  
 
For Kandinsky, art was about spirit. A simple point, or mark on a canvas, was both 
silent and spoke at the same time because it did not necessarily represent anything 
in particular but was the language through which the artist could convey themselves. 
For example, they could move the point to make a line if they sensed movement. 
They could make it a horizontal line if they wanted to convey stillness, or a vertical 
line for anticipation. Diagonals represented a union of the two. Depending on how 
they felt, different forces could act upon their lines turning them into angles or curves 
– and shapes and space could also be used to display sensation. The width of lines, 
for example, could be used to represent sound.14 Here, it is important to note that 
synaesthesia was a crucial part of Kandinsky’s art. ‘Synaesthesia’ suggests a 
resonance in one sensation could trigger one in another. For instance, if one heard a 
sound then this may be perceived as a colour: colour played a crucial role in 
Kandinsky’s work, particularly from a synesthetic perspective. This also tied into the 
general framework of Kandinsky’s work. It was the way in which all the senses, 
                                            
13 This can also be linked to what Patricia Easteal says about ‘andragogy’ and wider learning: Easteal, Patricia. 
"Teaching about the Nexus between Law and Society: From Pedagogy to Andragogy." Legal Educ. Rev. 18 
(2008): p.164 
  




especially, for Kandinsky, sound and music, came together to propel points, lines, 
shapes and colour on a living plane that was important (but there is certainly more to 
Kandinsky that just this).  
 
A more closer, detailed look at Kandinsky’s work and ideas will be undertaken in the 
full paper. However, a survey of the artist’s writing and work certainly shows that he 
felt that art was very much indicative of spirit. The notion of ‘the spirit’ in Kandinsky’s 
work, particularly his reference to the soul, does have specific theosophic qualities. 
For example, Vincent Tomas compares Kandinsky’s synaesthesia to deeper, 
spiritual vibrations. 15 However, what the full paper will argue is that Kandinsky’s own 
wider pedagogic theory – he was a member of the Bauhaus art school – can be used 
to encourage a greater contextual understanding of law by motivating students to 
take ownership of the analysis of law. 16 
 
 
5. Drawing a Legal-Kandinsky 
 
A detailed method will be provided in the final paper. However, by way of theorising 
its outlines here, if one were to take the test for oblique intention in R v Woollin 
above, namely: 
 
“…you cannot infer that he intended to do Karl really serious harm unless you are 
sure that serious harm was a virtual certainty from what he was doing and he 
appreciated that that was the case.” 
 
Having been given some background on Kandinsky, student’s would be, first and 
foremost, asked to sketch this test as a piece of art. Here, rather than focusing on 
the words such as ‘appreciation’, ‘foresight’ and ‘risk’ per se, they would be 
encouraged to draw how they feel about the words as a piece of art. Being a piece of 
art, they would not be bound by meaning. Using Kandinsky, they would just draw to 
                                            
15 Tomas, Vincent. "Kandinsky's theory of painting." The British Journal of Aesthetics 9.1 (1969): p.23 
 
16 On Kandinsky’s pedagogy at the Bauhaus, see Poling, Clark V. "Kandinsky’s Teaching at the Bauhaus." New 




how they feel about the test. They would claim sovereignty. Here, wider sounds and 
notions of justice may come in. The personal investment that comes with a piece of 
art may encourage them to look at the nuances of the law that they may otherwise 
not do if they were just focusing on the words.  
 

















The consequence of ‘serious harm’ could be a circle with no end and beginning, 












The notion that oblique intention is based on whether that serious harm was ‘virtually 
certain’ could be shown by a wavy line representing the many forces that contribute 
















The requirement that the ‘defendant also appreciated that risk was virtual certain’ 
















Colour could also be added to suggest feeling or emotion: for example, red to 
represent ‘serious injury’, green on the flexibility of ‘virtual certainty’ and a white 




















6. Conclusion: The Piano and Sounds of Justice  
 
These pieces of art may then have legal resonance and meaning for students. In this 
way, students could use creations of art as a starting point to tackle and take in 
different legal concepts.17 The very freedom and sovereignty of meaning in the being 
of art may facilitate this, whereas often the concreteness of words may not. 18 That is 
the basis on which this paper posits that art theory provides an effective, pedagogic 
starting point in studying law. Students in law schools begin their legal education with 
                                            
17 This can be related to ‘visual learning’: DeGroff, Eric A. "Training Tomorrow's Lawyers: What Empirical 
Research Can Tell Us About the Effect of Law School Pedagogy on Law Student Learning Styles." (2012). 
P.252 
 
18 As Kandinsky himself said, ‘There is no must in art because art is always free.’ Quoted in Tomas Op cit. p.32 
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words. They enthusiastically tackle those words with great fervour and this often 
means they take a rich approach to the law. Many students maintain this energy and 
as such do extremely well. However, sometimes, the concreteness of words and a 
misconstruction of SMART learning outcomes 19 disrupts this flow and students 
begin to focus more on the meaning of words, as opposed to their deeper contextual 
application. It is argued that using art as a pedagogic tool may assuage this.  
 
Moreover, this paper argues that Kandinsky’s ideas are one approach to this as it 
enables students to fully engage with their emotive feelings in understanding the law. 
Kandinsky believed that when artists perceived the world their soul vibrated. These 
vibrations could then be drawn as points, lines and colours on a plane. In this way, 
art was a manifestation of how the world moved their soul. It encapsulated their 
spirit. As he wrote, ‘the soul is the piano with the strings and the artist is the hands 
which by mean the tangents call forth the vibration of the human soul.’ 20 For him, art 
was the external expression of the internal. In the same way, students could 
essentially start by asking themselves what a law means to them: how it evokes the 
inner. Here, the full paper will explore in much more detail how student’s works of art 
can give sound to their inner piano of justice, justice being, at least, a feeling: art will 
stimulate emotions within them and support deeper, contextual argument. 21 It is 
hoped that this will give full voice to the orchestra of law that resides within them as 
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